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ABSTRACT
The Space Base Nuclear System Safety Plan (Volume VI) of the Manned Space Flight Nuclear
System Safety documentation consists of a qualitative identification of the steps required to
assure the incorporation of radiological system safety principles and objectives into all
phases of a Manned Space Base program. Specific areas of emphasis include:
1. Radiological Program Management
2. Nuclear System Safety Plan implementation
3. Impact on Program
4. Summary of the Key Operation and Design Guidelines and Requirements.
The plan clearly indicates the necessity of c~nsideringand implementing radiological sys-
tem safety recommendations as early as possible in the development cycle to assure maxi-
mum safety and minimize the impact on design and mission plans.
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FOREWORD
The establishment and operation of large manned space facilities in earth orbit would consti-
tute a significant step forward in space. Such long duration programs with orbital stay times
of up to ten years would benefit the earth's populace and the scientific community by provid-
ing:
1. A flexible tool for scientific research.
2. A permanent base for earth oriented applications.
3. A foundation for the future exploration of our universe.
Specifically, the NASA objectives include earth surveys and scientific disciplines of astron-
omy, bioscience, chemistry, physics and biomedicine, as well as the development of tech-
nology for space and earth applications.
Operational and design requirements, of large manned space vehicles, differ from those of
the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Of particular interest are the radiation sur-
vivability and nuclear safety requirements imposed by nuclear power reactors and isotopes
and the long term interaction with the natural radiation environment.
The General Electric Company under contract to NASA-MSFC (NAS8-26283) has performed
a study entitled "Space Base Nuclear System Safety" for the express purposes of addressing
the nuclear considerations involved in manned earth orbital missions. The study addresses
both operational and general earth populace and ecological nuclear safety aspects. The pri-
mary objective is to identify and evaluate the potential and inherent radiological hazards as-
sociated with such missions and recommend approaches for hazard elimination or reduction
of risk.
v
Work performed utilized the Phase A Space Base designs developed for NASA by North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas as baseline documentation.
The study was sponsored jointly by NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, Office of Ad-
vanced Research and Technology, and Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. It was
performed for NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center under the direction of Mr.
Walter H. Stafford of the Advanced Systems Analysis Office. He was assisted by a joint NASA
and AEC advisory group. chaired by Mr. Herbert Schaefer of NASA's Office of Manned Space
Flight.
The results of the study are presented in seven volumes, the titles of which are listed in
Table A. A cross-reference matrix of the subjects covered in the various volumes is pre-
sented in Table B.
Table A. Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety Documentation
Volume
I
Part 1
Part 2
II
Part 1
Part lA
III
Part 1
Part 2
Part 2A
Part 3
IV
Part 1
Part 2
V
Part 1
Part 2
VI
VII
Part 1
Part 2
Executive Summary
Space Base Nuclear Safety
Space Shuttle Nuclear Safety
Space Base Preliminary Nuclear Safety Analysis
Nuclear Safety Analysis (PSAR)
Appendix-Alternate Reactor Data (eRD)
Reactor System Preliminary Nuclear Safety Analysis
Reference Design Document (RDD)
Accident Model Document (AMD)
Accident Model Document - Appendix
Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)
Space Shuttle Nuclear System Transportation
Space Shuttle Nuclear Safety
Terrestrial Nuclear Safety Analysis
Nuclear System Safety Guidelines
Space Base Nuclear Safety
Space Shuttle/Nuclear Payloads Safety
Space Base Nuclear System Safety Plan
Literature Review
Literature Search and Evaluation
ASRDI Forms
Document No.
72SD4201-1-1
72SD4201-1-2
72SD4201-2-1
72SD4201-2-1A
72SD4201-3-1
72SD4201"';3-2
72SD4201-3-2A
72SD4201-3-3
72SD4201-4-1
72SD4201-4-2
72SD4201-5-1
72SD4201-5-2
72SD4201-6
72SD4201-7-1
72SD4201-7-2*
*Limited distribution
vi
This study employs the International system of units and where appropriate the equivalent
English units .are specified in brackets. A list of Conversion Factors and a Glossary of
Terms is included in the back of each volume.
Table B. Study Area Cross Reference
DOCUMENTATION
VOL I VOL II VOL III VOL IV VOL V VOL VI VOL VII
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE
The Space Base Nuclear System Safety Plan is designed to assure the timely, systematic
and comprehensive incorporation of radiological system safety principles and objectives
into all phases and aspects of a Manned Space Base program within the constraints imposed
by system requirements and contractual obligations.
The basic. radiological system safety principles applied in this program are:
1. The safety program must be thoroughly planned and implemented.
2. Inherent safety should be integrated into the basic design and usage of all hard-
ware that includes the man-media-machine interfaces.
3. Identification and elimination of hazards and safety deficiencies must be pursued
and achieved as early as possible in the development cycle and continued
throughout the life of the' program.
System safety objectives are realized when freedom from actual or potential nuclear/radio-
logical hazards, that can injure the general public, the crew and the ecology, or cause loss
of equipment, has been achieved throughout the mission.
As a means for accomplishing this goal, the Space Base Nuclear System Safety Plan is
oriented toward a preliminary identification and evaluation of potential hazards to provide
a recommended safety organization and key design and procedural engineering objectives
for the initial implementation of the safety program.
1.2 SCOPE
This plan encompasses all radiological safety aspects of a Space Base that were identified
and their integration into a General Space Base Program System Safety Plan. Specific
areas of emphasis include:
1-1
1. Implications of nuclear/natural radiological hazards on a Space Base, the general
public, the crew, the ecology and interfacing orbital hardware.
2. Impact of the presence of nuclear sources on supporting facilities and operations.
3. Safety constraints on design and operation of associated nuclear hardware.
4. Delineation of nuclear oriented safety operational and design guidelines and require-
ments for a Space Base Program.
As additional or alternative manned Space Base concept definitions and missions that impact
the radiological system safety criteria and analysis becomes available, this Safety Plan
should be updated.
1-2
SECTION 2
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
Key reference documents currently applicable toward the implementation of nuclear system
safety for manned space vehicles include the following:
DOCUMENT
DATE NUMBER TITLE
1969 AFETRM 127-1 Air Force Eastern Test Range Safety Manual
1970 AFETRM 160-1 Air Force Eastern Test Range Manual -
Medical Service - Radiation Control Program
KMI1150.9C Radiological and Isotopes Safety Committe
1970 KMI 1710. lB/SF The KSC Safety Program
1970 KMIl710, 13A/SF Safety Review of KSC Technical Operating
Procedures
1970 KMI 1860. l/lS Radiation Safety Policies and General Policies
1970 KMI 1860.2/IS Radiation Safety - Personnel Dosimetry
1969 KV-0-51 Apollo/Saturn V Launch Operations Plan
1969 KV-0-53 Apollo/Saturn V Ground Safety Plan
1967 KV-m-21 Apollo/Saturn IB Launch Operations Plan
1971 NCRP-39 Basic Radiation Protection Criteria
ORIGINATING
ORGANIZATION
U. S. Air Force (DOD)
U.S. Air Force
NASA-Kennedy Space Center
NASA-Kennedy Space Center
NASA-Kennedy Space Center
NASA-Kennedy Space Center
NASA-Kennedy Space Center
NASA-Kennedy Space Center
NASA-Kennedy Space Center
NASA-Kennedy Space Center
National Council for Radiation
Protection and Measurement
NHB 1700
1965 NMI 1052. 72A
and Supplemerts
NPD 1701.1
1969 ORNL-llC-19
1971 Radiation
Regulation-
Title 49
1964 SPA-41-8
1969 SPD No. lA
0500
10CFR20
10CFR20
20.403
1972 72S04201
NASA Safety Manual
NASA-AEC Inter-Agency Agreement
Isotopic SNAP Devices
Basic Policy on Safety
Isotope Users Guide
Transportation of Radioactive Materials
Radiological Safety Handbook
System Safety Requirements for Manned
Space Flight
AEC Manual - Health and Safety
Standards for Protection Against Radiation
Notification of Incidents
Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety
NASA
NASA
NASA
AEC-Oak Ridge National
Laboratory
US Department of Transportation
NASA
NASA-Office of Manned Space
Flight
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
U.S. Government
U. S. Government
General Electric Company -
Space Division
2-1
Reference s~ould be made to the NASA operated Aerospace Safety Research and Data
Institute in Cleveland, Ohio, and to Volume vn (72SD4201-7) of this study for additional
applicable literature.
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SECTION 3
SYSTEM SAFETY MANAGEMENT
3. 1 ORGANIZATION
Key to the effective implementation of radiological safety are (1) the placement of responsi-
bility within organizational structures of the NASA and contractor program offices and
NASA centers at levels where safety issues are brought to the attention of the Directors and
Program Manager and (2) provision of close communication ties between counte.rpart organi-
zations. Such a typical radiological safety organiational structure is illustrated in Figure
3-1.
The focal point for the review approval and coordination of radiological plans is the Radio-
logical Safety Office which is established within the system safety organization of the NASA
Space Base Program Office.
The typical safety responsibilities of the key offices within the NASA organization are dis-
cussed below.
A Radiological Safety Office shall be established within the system safety organization of
the Space Base Program Office (Figure 3-1). This office will be responsible for providing
liaison, review and approval of radiological safety programs, plans and procedures, radi-
ation safety monitoring, and operational radiological safety associated with the definition,
design, development, testing and operational phases of the Space Base Program.
A primary requirement for the Radiological Safety Office is that it have a direct line of
reporting to the Space Base Program Manager independent of any normal line organization.
This requirement will help assure the bringing of radiological safety issues, which have not
been resolved to the satisfaction of the safety organization, to the attention of the Program
Manager.
3-1
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It is essential that pre-planned assessments and contingency plans be available for the in-
herent potential radiological hazards and aspects associated with the Space Base Mission
operations involving nuclear or radioisotope devices. This will ensure that proper prevent-
ative, remedial, rescue or recovery procedures can be effectively implemented in the event
of an accident or incident where radioactive material is involved.
3.2 DIRECTOR. PROGRAM SYSTEM SAFETY OFFICE
A Director, Program System Safety Office, will report directly to the Program Director
and will be responsible for directing the overall Safety Program. The Safety Program
Director will have basic responsibility for the adequacy of safety planning in all matters of
safety. His responsibility will not abrogate the overall safety responsibility of the Com-
mander of the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) or Director, Center Safety Offices.
Among the many responsibilities of the Director, Program System Safety Office, is radi-
ation safety. The unique characteristics of radioactive materials, sources and ionizing
radiation producing devices with their potential and subtle impact on environmental health
requires a point of formal contact and coordination to comply with State and Federal regu-
lations and pertinent health and safety standards.
3.3 PROGRAM RADIATION PROTECTION OFFICER
A Program Radiation Protection Officer, reporting to the Director, Program System Safety
Office, shall be designated the point of formal contact and coordination during Program
Phases A, B, C and D on radiological safety and health matters of the program. Responsi-
bilities will not include flight hardware or operational hardware at Centers and formal inter-
faces with the Atomic Energy Commission, other governmental agencies, radiological and
isotopes safety committees, contractors and Center Safety Offices. He shall be responsible
for (1) implementing, review and approval of program level radiological safety programs,
plans and procedures, (2) providing monitoring and surveys to assure compliance with the
implemented programs, (3) providing advice on levels and types of training and experience
required for personnel to handle or use radiation sources and (4) maintainence of data and
location inventory of radioactive materials assigned to contractors or Centers on the pro-
gram.
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3.4 CENTER(S) RADIATION PROTECTION OFFICER
A Radiation Protection Officer, veporting to the Director, Center Safety Office, shall be
designated the point of formal contact and coordination on radiological safety and health
matters at the Center(s). He shall be responsible for (1) interfacing with the Atomic
Energy Commission, other governmental agencies, Center and Program Safety Offices,
(2) implementing Center radiological safety programs, (3) providing monitoring and surveys
to assure compliance with implemented programs (4) providing advice on levels and types
of training and experience required for center personnel authorized to handle or use radi-
ation sources, and (5) maintain data, location and inventory of radioactive materials at the
center.
The Launch Center Radiation Protection Officer shall assume control and initiate action in
radiological emergencies located at the Launch Center during the interval between hardware
arrival at the Launch Center and orbital insertion. The Mission Control Center Radiation
Protection Officer shall assume control and initiate action in radiological emergencies of
flight hardware from orbital insertion through disposal of the radioactive materials. To
facilitate the liaison with interfacing government agencies and Center functions in radiologi-
cal safety and health matters and emergencies, the Center Radiation Protection Office(s)
shall operate a Radiological Control Center(s) and provide space for the following personnel:
1. AFETR Representative (Launch Center Only)
2. Recovery Team Chief Representative
3. AECjAlbuquerque Operations Coordinator
4. AECjHeadquarters Safety Chief
5. Public Health Service Operations Team
6. Public Affairs Office Coordinator
7. Meteorologists
8. Consultants
3-4
,9. Environmental Protection Agency Representative
10. State Department or Executive Office Representative.
3. 5 INTERFACES WITH CONTRACTORS AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Interfaces will be established with (1) contractors performing definition and assessment
studies or hardware design and development of radioactive devices on board the Space
Base, and (2) government agencies furnishing equipment or facilities to assure the com-
patibility with the Space Base radiological safety program. Interface control documents
and the normal channels established for design interfaces will be used to the full extent
possible. ,
3.6 INTERFACES WITH INDUSTRIAL AND PUBLIC SAFETY
Radiological safety interfaces will be established between contractors furnishing or operating
nuclear hardware and industrial and public safety to (1) ensure compliance with state and
federal government regulations, (2) ensure that permissible dosage is not exceeded, and
(3) establish pre-planned contingency procedures and necessary training for use in the
event of radiological emergencies.
3.7 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY' AUDITS AND SURVEYS
Periodic audits and surveys should be conducted by the Center Safety Offices and supported
by contractors operating, developing and assembling radioactive devices to assure com-
pliance with the radiological safety requirements of the Space Base program and applicable
state and federal regulations for protection against radiation. Audits at the Launch Center
shall be assigned to the KSC Health Physics Contractor subject to review by KSC, RPO and
by the AEC.
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SECTION 4
NUCLEAR SAFETY PLAN
This nuclear system safety plan is intended for the entire life cycle of a Space Base program
which spans the definition, design, development, operational and end of mission phases. The
recommended radiological safety milestones shown in Table 4-1 are established to provide
timely inputs to enhance safety and reflect safety program elements contained in NASA Safety
Program Directive No. 1A.
4. 1 PRELIMINARY RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTS
These reports identify and evaluate the potential radiological hazards to the crew, onboard
equipment and earth's populace and ecology.
One report entitled "Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System" provides
preliminary nuclear safety data for the AEC and consists of a series of three parts:
1. Reference Design Do cument
2. Accident Model Document
3. Nuclear Safety Analysis Document.
The PSAR is intended to provide NASA and the AEC with a preliminary analysis of the
potential risk to the general public imposed by the nuclear power modules of a Space Base.
This report also contains recommendations for preventative measures and areas of additional
study in improving the nuclear safety of the mission related to the nuclear power modules.
The report will also serve as a point of departure for the more comprehensive Safety Analysis
Report (SAR) and Safety Evaluation Report (SER) ultimately required for flight approval.
The second report is entitled, "Preliminary Safety Analysis Report - Space Base". The
intent of this report is to identify those potential and inherent radiological hazards of a
Space Base Program (crew, subsystems, experiments, ground support operations, etc.)
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and recommend approaches for their elimination or reduction to acceptable risk levels.
This report can serve as a checklist for further safety efforts during the design and de-
velopment program and the foundation for the formulation and implementation of the nuclear
safety oriented guidelines and requirements.
4.2 SPECIAL RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY STUDIES
Safety areas may be identified that require further study to determine the feasibility of
radiological safety enhancement. An example of such areas include the feasibility of using
the Shuttle as a means of transporting and disposing of nuclear hardware, attaching ablative
shields to. a reactor after end-of-life shutdown to provide intact reentry capability for dis-
posal etc.
4.3 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ANALYSES REPORTS
Comprehensive safety analyses of nuclear systems are required prior to actual flight. Interim
SafetyAnalysis Reports should be prepared after the Phase B definitions are completed. Sub-
mittal should occur no later than two years before flight.
The Safety Analysis Report - Reactor System is an update of the preliminary and interim
reports. The analysis shall be based on firm design, mission and operational data to pro-
vide a most realistic evaluation of the mission radiological risk to the earth's general popu-
lace. This document, to be submitted a minimum of six months prior to flight, is used as
a data base by NASA and the AEC in developing the Safety Evaluation Report (SER). The SER,
used in obtaining flight approval, is required no later than three months prior to actual flight.
It is necessary that the SAR and SER reports be updated to reflect design or operational
changes which significantly eliminate, mitigate, or increase potential hazards.
Flight approval documentation will also be required for other hardware made a part of a
Space Base program which contains potentially hazardous quantities of nuclear material.
4-3
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4. ~ NUCLEAR ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Refinement of radiological safety,requirementsassociated with the Space Base nuclear
electrical power system is dependent on the type and configuration of the reactor, heat
exchanger, and power conversion system selected. Specific characteristics and operations
requirements for a particular nuclear power system impacts radiological safety. Thes~
radiological safety requirements shall be. refined prior to a preliminary design review
during the design phase and contain the criteria for the safety requirements.
4.5 CONTRACTOR SAFETY AND DATA REQUIREMENTS
Safety requirements for a contractor's product or service are usually specified for procure-
ment purposes. These requirements are often required to be exhibited in forms of analysis
results, plans, reports, organizational responsibility, procedures, constraints, safety
devices or features, redundant or alternate performance modes and configurations. The
basic outline used in this system safety plan is also a suggested outline for the contractor's
safety plan.
4.6 SPECIAL RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY TESTS
Safety devices are often incorporated in hardware designs to enhance personnel and/or equip-
ment safety. Usually it is required that the effectiveness of these devices be demonstrated
with tests. An example of such a safety device is a reactor control drum lockout mechanism.
Evaluation demonstrations should be considered for any untested safety devices prior to their
incorporation into the Space Base design and flight hardware.
4.7 NUCLEAR SuPPORT FACILITY SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND PLANS
The safety requirements for support facilities associated with the nuclear power system and
radioisotopes for use on a Space Base should be delineated so that their impact on facilities
plans can be incorporated in their design and construction. Examples of nuclear safety re-
quirements for support facilities may be a radiation monitoring system and partial pressure
systems that would contain any radioactive partic~es in the event of an accidental radioactive
material release. Special liquid metal handling and fire fighting equipment would also be
required.
..;
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4. 8 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY CONTINGENCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES
Contingency plans and procedures shall be provided that will cope with any type of radio-
logical emergency that can: arise on a Space, Base program. If rescue and recovery actions
are warranted, organizational element responsibilities should be designated so that training
and demonstrated proficiency can be completed prior to the possible occurrence of the po-
tential radiological hazard.
4.9 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS
Support and assistance required by NASA from other governmental agencies in the event of
a potential radiological emergency, shall be formally agreed to by responsible personnel
in those governmental agencies involved. Such formal agreements facilitate those delegated
agency elements in training and providing the needed assistance in a timely manner during
any Space Base radiological emergency. An example may be the support of NASA in the
detection and recovery of released radioactive material by the U. S. Atomic Energy
Commission.
4.10 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION
Skills in operating a nuclear reactor, conducting tests with reactor coolants, handling
radioisotopes, and operating radiation detection and monitoring equipment usually requires
special training. Such training provides appreciation of the potential hazards and establishes
remedial actions required in the event of radiological emergencies in addition to proficiency
in operation of equipment and monitoring systems. Usually this training and certification
requirement is completed prior to the construction or fabrication of the radiological equip-
ment for operational use.
4.11 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY SURVEYS
Periodic surveys provide a means for determining the adequacy of prepared safety plans
and procedures and their implementation toward achieving the radiological safety goals of
the Space Base program. The necessity of periodic safety surveys is usually desirable be-
cause of personnel changes and possible degradation of implemented safety practices and
4-5
skills with time when they are not used frequently. These periodic surveys also provide a
means for determining the progress made from the safety efforts on the program.
4.12 RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORTING
Any incidents or accidents that result in excessive exposure of personnel to radiation or
the release of radioactive material shall be reported and carefully documented. It is
essential that the responsible personnel in the governmental agencies involved (i. e., NASA,
AEC, DOD) be informed of such accident/incidents for providing information as requested
to the executive and legislative branches of the government as well as the public. Reporting
procedures which may be used as references are:
1. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 20.403 (AEC)
2. NASA Management Instruction 1052. 72A
3. NASA Safety Manual NHB 1700. 1, Volume I, Chapter 9
4. Apollo/Saturn V Ground Safety Plan, KSC SNAP-27
Radiological Control Plan, K-V-053, Volume II, Supp. 11
5. The KSC Safety Program KMI 1710.1B/SF.
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SECTION 5
SPACE BASE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY STUDY
This section contains data from the Space Base Nuclear System Safety Study performed
under NASA Contract NAS 8-26283 considered pertinent in the implementation of a Nuclear
System Safety Plan.
5.1 RADIOLOGICAL GOALS
The Space Base program shall have as radiological safety goals (1) minimizing radiological
exposure to humans, (2) not exceeding established maximum allowable exposure limits to
humans (fables 5-1 and 5-2), and minimize mission aborts or loss of equipment attributed to
radiological emergencies.
Table 5-1. Dose Limits for Crew and Ground Radiation Workers
Currcntly in Use (10 CFR lO)
r Exposure Condition Dose (rem)
• Whole Body - Head, trunk, active blood- Accumulated 5 (N -18 yr)
forming organs, gonads. lens of eye Quarterly 1. 25 Recommended (NCRP-39) Jan. 15, 1971
Exposure Condition Dose (rem)
·
Skin - of wholc body Year 30.00
Quarterly 7.50 • Whole Body Long Term 5 (N-18 yr)
Accumulated 5/Year
• !lands - and forearms, feet and ankles Year 7:;.00. • ~ Year 15Quarterly 11:1.75
• Hands, Feet & Ankles Ycar 75
Quarterly 25
• Forearms Year 30
Quarterly 10
• Othe r Organs Year
L-)
Quurtcrly :J
Crew Radiation Limits (rem)
Area I Yr Avg 30
Depth Daily Day Quarter Year Career
Skin (0.1 mm) 0.6 73 1U5 ~25 l:!OO
Eye (3 mm) 0.3 37 52 ll~ 600
Marrow (5 cm) 0.2 ~5 35 75 .00
Table 5-2. Dose Guidelines for General Populace
Permitted Exposure Standards (10 CFR ~O)
Exposure Dose Rate
• Whole Body O. OOl rem/hr Accident Exposure Guidelines
0.100 rem/wk Exposure Dose (rem)
0.500 rem/yr IExternal'
• Whole Body l5*
IInternal ,
• 70 Year Bone 150**
Dose
• Thyroid 300**
• Lower Large 75**
Intestine
*10 CFR-I00
**DML 50-268
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5.2 REFERENCE CRITERIA
The general criteria and significant system features associated with the radiological pro-
gram of the reference Space Base are listed in Table 5-3.
Table 5-3. Space Base System Features
Reactor System
Configuration
Orbit
Launch Vehicle
Launch Trajectory
Lifetimes
Crew Size
Experiments
Logistics
Power Module Disposal
Reactor Shield
Space Base Definition
2-ZrH reactor-Brayton power modules, each with 330
kWt (50 kWe) nominal rating-600 kWt maximum
Power modules on extendable booms of zero-g core.
Art-g rotating hubs.
500 kIn (273 nm), 550 inclination
Saturn INT-21 (launch of 1 or 2 power modules)
460 launch azimuth from KSC; Eurasian over-fly
Mission - 10 years, reactor - nominally 5 years, power
conversion system - nominally 2. 5 years
50 (nominal)· with 90 to 180 day crew rotation cycle
Extensive on-board and orbiting subsatellite program
Space Shuttle - primary logistics vehicle, Space Tug -
final rendezvous and docking of power module
Boost by integral Disposal System to 990 kIn high altitude
disposal orbit.
Shaped 41T lithium hydride neutron shield 11 mrem/hr
tungsten gamma shield at nearest
habitable
interface
North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas Phase
A studies.
Figure 5-1 illustrates the Space Base reactor power module concept.
5.3 RADIOLOGICAL ANALYSES
Safety analyses oriented to radiological safety of a program such as the Space Base were
applied in the Space Base Nuclear System Safety Study. The overall study, development of
data and principal conclusions are intended as a point of departure for subsequent phases
5-2
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Figure 5-1. Reactor Power Modules Details
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of, manned space flight programs where similar radiological hazards will be encountered.
Basic assumptions and reference design data were clearly defined and in some instances
parametric data supplied to assist in the extrapolation of results when deviations from the
reference are made.
The safety analyses consisted of the tasks as illustrated in Figure 5-2.
Task A, Program Management, provided overall technical and financial control for the
total program.
Tasks B, 1. 0 and 2.0 made up the definition and supporting phases of the study. The Base-
~
line Definition provided the reference vehicle and mission information reqUired to perform
a safety evaluation of the two Space Base concepts. The Literature Review identified and
made available for use existing reports, computer programs and unpublished data that
were potentially applicable to the study. Pertinent information was provided on ASRDI
forms for use by NASA's Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute at LeRe. Task
2.0 identified the radiation limits for the hardware and personnel associated with the Space
Base Program. Task 3. 0 involved the identification and characterization of potential nuclear
and nuclear related hazards associated with the Space Base program.
An operational safety evaluation of the Space Base program was performed in Task 4. O.
The hazards identified in Task 3. 0 were evaluated to determine their potential effect and
impact on Space Base hardware, personnel and operations. Development of hazard fault
and failure sequence trees were included. Subtasks 4.2 and 4.3 identified design and opera-
tional guidelines, procedures and requirements that will reduce or eliminate the hazards
identified.
A detailed nuclear safety evaluation of the reference reactor power system was performed
in Task 5. O. Trade-off studies were performed in Subtask 5. 1 to determine the effects on
safety of alternate power system configurations.
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Operational analyses performed in Subtask 5.2 provided guidelines and procedures for the
operation, repair, replacement and disposal of the power module. Subtask 5.3 provided
a terrestrial nuclear safety analysis of the reactor power modules to determine the hazards
and degree of risk to the general populace and ecology.
Task 6. 0 provided radiological safety guidelines and procedures for the mission support
functions of the program such as launch, range safety, orbital support, and recovery.
Documentation of all work including PSAR's, guidelines and the nuclear safety plan was
carried out in Task 7. o. Reference should be made to the other volumes of this report
for detailed analysis and results of all the tasks.
The mission phases applied in the analyses are listed in Figure 5-3.
4.0 END OF MI SS ION
• POWER PLANT DISPOSAL
SEPARATION
TRANSFER TO HIGH ORBIT "'__00(
• SPACE BASE CLOSEOUT
CONTINGENCY PLANS
RECOVERY
POWERPLA NT - 9'10 KM ORB IT
ISOTOPES - RECOVERY
SHUTILE
3.0 ORB ITAL OPERATIONS
• ORB ITAL BU ILDUP
• CHECKOUT
• START-UP
• OPERATIONAL MODE
• CONTINGENCY OPERATION
2.0 LAUNCH/ASCENT
• LAUNCH
• S-II; BOOST
• S-II BOOST
• RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING
1. 0 PRELAUNCH
• TRANSPORTATION
• RECEIPT. INSPECTION, STORAGE
• CHECKOUT AND ASSEMBLY
• INTEGRATION
• COUNTDOWN
r BUILD-UP 1(5 WEEKS
lOYEAR MISSION
POWERPLANT REPLACEMENT - 5 YR
SHUTILE RESUPPLY
EXPERIMENTATION
50 CREW (ART GAND ZERO Gl
INTERFACING VEHICLE SUPPORT
\,
, INT-21 BOOSTER
SINGLE OR DUAL REACTOR LAUNCH
SHUTILE SUPPORT LAUNCHES
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Figure 5-3. Mission Phases
The radiation sources considered in the radiological hazard analysis throughout the Space
Base mission phases are those identified in Table 5-4.
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An additional task was performed which addressed nuclear safety aspects of transporting
nuclear hardware to an from a Space Base by a Space Shuttle. Results from that task are
not a part of this System Safety Plan, although implementation of the radiological safety
program for the Shuttle would require similar activities. Reference should be made to
study documentation 72SD4201-4 for further details.
5.4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND CATEGORIZATION
The specific potential radiological sources and hazards identified in the Space Base Nuclear
System Safety Study are summarized in Tables 5-5 and 5-6 to provide a starting point for
continuing safety efforts of Manned Space Flight Programs.
Categorization of these radiological hazards are consistent with the hazard categories listed
in the NASA Office of Manned Space Flight Safety Program Directive No.1, Revision A.
Since many of these identified potential hazards could occur in different degrees of severity,
the rationale used in categorizing these hazards was to list a potential range of the occur-
rence or the "worst case" or most severe condition.
The probability of occurrence in most cases is or can be made very low. Reference should
be made to Volumes II, III and IV of the study documentation where the hazards are discussed,
probabilities are determined, risks evaluated and design and operational features are recom-
mended to minimize and in some cases prevent these hazards from occurring.
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Table 5-5. Space Base Operations - Hazard Sources by Mission Phase
(Ground and Flight Personnel and Mission Hardware
NORMAL CONDITIONS MI8810N PHASES
Hazard Source Source Condition Potential Hazard Prelaunch LaunchlAacent Orbital Oper. End-of-Misslon
Natural Radiation
Environment
Geom&IJIStically Varying Degree of Excessive RadiaUon NIA Neg Neg Neg
Trapped Protou. Intenalty Dependtng
Electrons aDd on Orbit Position
GalacUc Cosmic Ravs
Solar Radiation Solar Flare Excessive Radiation !'IfA Neg~Marg !'Ieg~Marg !'leg Marg
Reactor Power System Shutdown (No OperaUag Exceselve Radiation Neg, Neg Neg NIA
History)
Shutdown (Post Exceaslve Radiation NIA NIA Neg !'leg
ODeratlonl
Normal Operatlag Exceaslve Radiation NIA NIA Neg NIA
Power Thennal Interference NIA NIA Neg~ Marg NIA
Emergency Operating Excessive Radiation NIA NIA Neg~ Marg NIA
Power Thennal Interference NIA Neg- Marg NIA
Interfacing Vehicles
Shutdown (Post Excessive Radiation NIA NIA Neg NIA
'Reusable Nuclear O..........on'
Shuttle Normal Power Excessive Radiation NIA NIA Neg NIA
(Thrustlllll:)
'Orbltal Propellant Shutdown (Post Excessive Radiation NIA NIA NIA NIADepot (Reactor Onerationl
Power System Normal Operntlng Excessive Radiation NIA NIA Neg NIA
Power
Experiment Laboratories
X-ray Equlpm8llts As Installed Excessive Radiation Neg NIA Neg NIA
Open Radioisotope Stored Excessive Radiation Nell Nell Nell Neg
SourcesIT_~ers In Use Radioactive Contamination NA NA N- NA
Closed Isotope As Installed Excessive Radtatlon Neg Neg Neg Neg
SourceslCapsules As Installed Excessive Radiation Neg Neg Neg Neg
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
Damaged Reactor Excessive Radiation Neg Neg Crlt. Crit
ShIeld Tritium Release Nell Nesr Ma... Marg
NaK Coolanl Release Excessive Radiation Neg Neg Neg~ Marg Neg ~ Marg
(Activated NaK)
Stnlctural Corrosion Neg Neg Neg - Crlt Neg - Cri!.
Equipment Contamlnntlon Neg Neg Neg ~ Crlt Neg - Crit
Personnel Contamination Nell Nell Nell ~ Crit Neg - Crit
Space Base Reactor Fls slon Product and Excessive Radiation Neg Neg Neg ~ Crit Neg - Crit
Power System NaK Coolant Leak Stnlctural Corrosion Neg Neg Neg ~ Crlt Neg - Crlt
EquIpment Contamination Neg Neg Neg - Crtt Neg ~ Crit
Personnel Contamination Nell Neg NSJ( - Crit Neg - Crit
Non-Destructive Excessive Radiation Marg Marg Marg Marg
Excursion
Destructive Excessive Radiation Crit - Cat Crlt - Cat Crtt -Cat Crlt -Cat
Excursion Stnlctural Corrosion Crit - Cat Crlt ~ Cat Crlt ~Cat Crlt-Cat
Equipment Contamination Crlt - Cat Crlt - Cat Crlt -Cat Crtt -Cat
Radioactive Debris Crtt - Cat Crlt - Cat Crlt -Cat Crit -Cat
Interfacing Vehicles
Fission Products In Excessive Radiation NIA N/A Neg Neg
'Reusable Nuclear Plume
Shuttle Reactor Disassembly Excessive Radtatlon NIA N/A Marg N/A
Loss of Attltude Control Excessive Radtatlon N/A WA MaN N/A
'Orbltal Propellant (Same as Space Base (Same aa Space Base NIA N/A Marg NfA
Service Depot Reactor Power System) Reactor Power System)
Experiment Laboratories
X-ray Equipmentl Inadvertent Turn-On Excessive Radiation Neg-Marg NIA Neg- Marg Neg- Marg
Dvna!ntc Generators
Isotope Tracersl Release to Space Internal Exposure of NIA N/A Neg,- Cat Neg - Cat
Onen Sources Base Environment Critcal Bodv OrllSDS
Closed Sourcesl ShIelding Fallurel Excessive Radiation Neg~ Marg Neg~ Marg Neg- Marg Neg- Marg
Isotope Capsules Removal
Encapsulation Internal Exposure of NIA N/A Neg- Marg Neg - Marg
Fatlure Critical Body Organs
• Prelaunch aDd launch of these vehicles Is not Included. Legend: NIA - Not Applicable
Neg - Negligible
Marg - Marginal
Crlt - Critical
Cat - Cataatrophlc
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Table 5-6. Potential Reactor Terrestrial Radiological Hazards
Source Condition
Hazard Source (Arising From) Potential Hazard
Reactor, Non-destmctive Excursion, Prompt neutron and gamma radiation
Ground Level Ground Level (Relatively low level with shield around reactor)
Quasi-Steady State Prompt neutron and gamma radiation which may
Critical be attenuated due to shielding from water or
partial burial
Shutdown Radiation Gamma radiation from fission product decay
-and activated materials.
Destmctive Excursion, Prompt neutron and ganuna radiation.
Ground Level
Airborn Fission Destmctive Excursion, Gamma and beta radiation from a cloud of radio-
Products and/or Ground Level active material contributing direct radiation to
Activated Materials the body and inhalable particles.
Reactor Disassembly on Impact Same as above
Reentry Heating/Burn-up Gamma and beta radiation from radiative material
in the stratosphere or mesosphere with potential
of wide dispersal at relatively low dose levels.
Ground Deposited Destmctive Excursion, Gamma and beta radiation at ground level
Fission Products Ground Level
and/or Activated Reactor Disassembly on Gamma and beta radiation at ground level.Materials Impact Dose levels dependent on fission product decay
time.
Reentry Heating/Burn-up Low level radiation deposited on the ground over
a relatively wide area from an atmospheric burn-up.
Bare Fuel Elements Destmctive Excursion, Direct gamma and beta radiation from ground
and/or Activated Ground Level deposited and scattered fuel elements and materials.
Structural Materials Reactor Disassembly on Impact Same as above.
Re-entry Heating/Burn-up Direct gamma and beta radiation from impacted
fuel elements and materials.
Fission Products Destmctive Excursion in Gamma and beta radiation (Sr90, 1131 etc. )
and/or Activated Water Supply deposited in water supply and ingested into body.
Materials Deposited Reentry Heating, Material Same as above - possibly smaller quantities.in Drinldng Water Deposited in Water Supply
Fission Products Destmctive Excursion (Over Gamma and beta radiation (Sr90, etc.) deposited
and/or Activated Moderation) in water, consumed by marine life and subse-
Materials Deposited quently ingested into human body.
in Waters Containing Reentry Heating, Material Same as above - possibly smaller quantities.Edible Marine Life Deposited in Water
Fission Products Destmctive Excursion in Possible direct radiation and inhalable and
Released in Orbit Orbit ingestionable particles from airborne or
ground/water deposited fission products and
materials.
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5.5 HAZARDS ANALYSES
5.5.1 MISSION SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Mission support operations analyses conducted in the Space Base Nuclear System Safety
Study of the identified radiological hazards resulted in these significant results:
1. The reactor can be designed to present minimum hazards during prelaunch opera-
tions at the launch center. Fission product inventories should be negligible with
minimum criticality tests performed at the point of manufacture and no such tests
at the launch center.
2. Liquid metal fire protection is incompatible with present fire suppression at the
iaunch center. Modifications in present fire protection techniques are required
including the addition of liquid metal fire suppressants, isolation barriers and
sumps etc. Liquid metal fire hazards can be minimized by use of nonliquid metal
radiators, provision of double wall containment and use of inert gas blankets.
3. The necessity and desirability of integrating and testing the reactor power module
within the Vehicle Assembly Building is questionable. Consideration should be
given for a direct transfer of the power module from the Nuclear Assembly Building
to the Launch Pad.
4. Extensive use can be made of existing facilities at KSC. A nuclear assembly and
storage facility, and a minimum liquid metal servicing facility are required.
5. A universal reactor power module transport and storage trailer provided with
environmental protection and status monitoring can serve in transport, storage,
checkout and integration operations to minimize handling functions and potentially
hazardous situations.
6. Isotope heat sources require redundant prelaunch cooling and should be integrated
with the launch vehicle as late in the countdown sequence as feasible.
7. Mission Control can assist in the radiological monitoring and control of the crew
and provide supporting diagnostic data for the rapid maintenance and/or replace-
ment of nuclear hardware.
8. Quick response recovery and decontamination teams are required at KSC. A
mobile team coupled with advance warning of impending impact can minimize
the potential hazard to the general populace.
9. Relatively high inclinations (550 ) may require Eurasian overfly prior to orbital
insertion. Destruct systems could be safed to minimize Eurasian impact
potential.
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5.5.2 ORBITAL OPERATIONS
Orbital operations analyses, conducted in the Space Base Nuclear System Safety Study, of
the identified radiological hazards resulted in these significant results:
1. The natural space radiation environment in typical Space Base earth orbits can
present a more severe hazard to the crew and space subsystems than a shielded
operating reactor. The dose rate from the reactors at the nearest crew module is
approximately 1 mrem/hr contrasted to 3 mrem/hr obtained from the natural space
radiation environment in a 500 km 55 degree inclination orbit.
2. Ten year orbital missions with crew stay-times of one year are feasible. Pre-
dicted solar flare activity and practical Space Base module shielding necessitate
storm shelter provisions for crew stay-times of over one year. The eye dose
limits as defined by the National Academy of Sciences appears to make the eyes
the limiting body organ. Increased shielding in headgear can help to reduce the
doses to the eyes.
3. The normal space base reactor environment allows for Space Shuttle and Tug
rendezvous at any view angle if loiter times are minimized and breaking gate
times and velocities are maintained within currently planned specifications. A
crewman flying a rendezvous with the flight path directly head-on to the power
module (worst case) was calculated to receive a maximum integrated dose of
approximately 24 mrem.
4. The radiation limits on the storage and usage of film may present one of the most
frequent resupply requirements. High speed films stored or contained within 20
gm/cm2 shielding will have lifetimes of 25 to 50 days, provided no solar flares
occur. A solar flare could eliminate the entire stored film supply.
5. Several of the experiments identified in the "NASA Blue Book" are susceptible to
dynamic interference which can be attributed to the radiation environment. .Dy-
namic interference is assumed to exist where signal to noise ratios greater than
1:10 result from the radiation received. Solar flares, high radiation belts such
as the South Atlantic anomaly, or radiation from the Space Base and interfacing
vehicle reactors can be sources of this problem. Although shielding can, in some
instances, minimize the problem, in many cases the best solution is an operational
restriction which calls for a temporary termination of experimentation. Location
changes and distance restrictions can also be made.
6. Dynamic interference thresholds of the sub-satellite experiments require nominal
separation distance from the Space Base reactors of from several meters to several
kilometers.
5-12
7. Typical susceptible experiments to dynamic interference are the Grazing Incidence
X-ray Telescope, Functional Program Element (FPE) 5.1, and the High Energy
Stellar Survey Experiment, FPE 5.5. During operation, they are relatively sus-
ceptible to gamma and neutron radiation emitted by the reactor and should be con-
sidered candidates for detached modules orbiting at distances of several kilometers
from the reactor interface.
8. In addition to the nuclear power reactors and the natural environment, there are
several additional potential sources of radiation. It is important that the isotope
heat sources and isotope tracers contained in the modules be properly shielded
and contained to prevent contamination of the Space Base and minimize the
integrated doses to the crew in the event of a release.
9. Subsystems of the Space Base are not severly affected by the combined reactor
and space radiation environment over the 10 year mission. However, where
threshold damage to electronics may result, piece part selection, and if necessary,
radiation hardening can be performed to minimize if not eliminate the problem.
10. The reactor shield of the Space Base is designed to maintain very low radiation
levels at the nearest habitable module « 1 mrem/hr). Relatively heavy shielding
away from the Space Base is also provided. Lighter reactor shields and higher
operating thermal power levels will increase the radiation levels and likewise in-
crease the hazards to the crew, subsystems and experiments.
11. Biological experiments (specimens) exhibit a wide range of radiation sensitivity.
The radiation protection required is dependent on the specimen, type, age, and
the experiment objective. Monitoring the radiation dose to sensitive bioscience
experiments is recommended.
12. A reactor shield leak in orbit can result in increased radiation which increases
with time. Compartmentalized and/or increased shield cladding combined with
leak detection instrumentation can minimize the hazard and allow more time for
repair.
13. The presence of a reactor(s) on the Space Base Mission requires a minimum of
additional radiological control support. It is estimated that in a crew of 50, an
averaged time of at least 3 men are required to support the entire radiological
control program, the direct support of the reactors accounting for only 1/2 of
a crewman.
5.5.3 REACTOR POWER MODULE STUDIES
Significant results of several qualitative studies of the nuclear safety implications concerned
with the reactor power module configuration and operation include the follOWing:
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· 1. The servicing, replacement and operating characteristics of multiple reactor
power modules are enhanced by providing adequate power module to Space Base
core separation distances. Rendezvous corridors should also be considered in
the configuration layout.
2. The Brayton and organic Rankine cycle power conversion systems permit relatively
low temperature operation which in turn allows the use of non-liquid metal radiators.
Toxic, corrosive and explosive coolants should be avoided where feasible.
3. Several Power Conversion System (PCS) features can increase nuclear safety:
(1) multiple operating PCS units are preferred for safe shutdown and to minimize
temperature transients, and (2) a separable heat exchanger allows for a modular
powerplant and permits significant increases in the reentry ballistic coefficient
thereby extending reactor orbital lifetimes by as much as a factor of 10.
4. The ZrH thermal reactor exhibits several inherent safety features: (1) desirable
negative temperature coeffiCient, (2) compact minimum void space, reducing fuel
load susceptibilty to core compaction accidents, and (3.) release of hydrogen within
core upon a temperature excursion provides inherent shutdown capability.
5. Disposal of a reactor power module is best accomplished by boosting to a long life
(> 100 year decay) high earth orbit or recovery via the Space Shuttle. Random
reentry and/or burn up in the earth's atmosphere are politically, if not radio-
logically, unacceptable.
6. Positive and permanent shutdown is recommended. Neutron poison injection
coupled with drum lockouts are feasible techniques.
7. Maintenance operations involving the PCS and other life limited components within
a pressurized and temperature controlled engine room located in the aft section
of the power module, was determined to be feasible and crew radiation limits
would not be exceeded with both reactors operating. Repair of the primary loop,
shield and reactor systems during or after operation is deemed not feasible;
5.5.4 TERRESTRIAL SAFETY
A preliminary terrestrial safety analysis (safety of the earth's general populace) was per-
formed for all phases of the Space Base mission (Reference Volume ill (72SD4201-3) of the
Study). These analyses resulted in these significant results:
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· 1. The overall Space Base mission radiological risk to the general populace is low
and can be further reduced by the incorporation of several design and procedural
features:
a. Design for no excursion
b. Assure shield reentry capability
c. Provide for intact reentry
d. Consider use of Shuttle for recovery.
2. Minimum risk exists during the early phases of the mission (e. g., KSC prelaunch
operations) due to the low fission product inventory of the reactor. Radiological
exposure and contamination is confined within the KSC boundary.
3. Present fallback/exclusion areas and KSC boundaries (4 km and 13 km, respectively)
are adequate for the mission.
4. Deep ocean impact presents negligible risk. A slightly higher risk results from
impact along the Continental Shelf.
5. The most significant reactor radiological source terms result from (1) a destruc-
tive excursion, (2) distributed fuel elements, structural debris and deposited
fission products from an impacted reactor, (3) quasi-steady state operation of the
reactor after impact.
6. Low level radiation over large areas result from a reentry burnup. Radiological
consequences are small but political implications should be considered.
7. The LiH radiation/heat shield exhibits questionable reentry capability.
8. Fission product inventories are high immediately after shutdown of a reactor that
has been operating at full power for months and years. Decay time of> 10 days
allows rendezvous and transport by Space Shuttle.
9. Fission product inventories decay to insignificant values for time periods greater
than 100 years after shutdown.
10. The dominant risk occurs during the disposal phase due to disposal failures which
result in relatively early reentries and the eventual reentry and impact or landing
on the earth's surface in all situations.
5-15
5. 6 HAZARD REDUCTION
Specific recommendations for eliminating or mitigating those radiological hazards identified
in the Space Base Nuclear System Safety Study are summarized in consonance with the
hazard reduction precedence sequence of the OMSF Safety Program Directive No.1,
Revision 4. This hazard reduction precedence sequence is as follows:
5.6. 1 DESIGN FOR MINIMUM HAZARD
The major effort throughout the design phases shall be to insure inherent safety through
the selection of appropriate design features (e. g., fail safe design, redundancy, increased
ultimate safety factor).
5.6.2 SAFETY DEVICES
Known hazards which cannot be eliminated through design selection shall be reduced to the
acceptable level through the use of appropriate safety devices as part of the system, sub-
system, or equipment.
5.6.3 WARNING DEVICES
Where it is not possible to preclude the existence or occurrence of a known hazard, devices
shall be employed for the timely detection of the condition and the generation of an adequate
warning signal. Warning signals and their application shall be designed to minimize the
probability of wrong signals or of improper personnel reaction to the signals.
5.6.4 SPECIAL PROCEDURES
Where it is not possible to reduce the magnitude of an existing or potential hazard through
design, or the use of safety and warning devices, special procedures shall be developed
to counter hazardous conditions for enhancement of ground and flight crew safety. Pre-
cautionary notations shall be standardized in accordance with the direction of the procuring
activity.
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Residual hazards for which safety or warning devices and special procedures cannot be
developed or provided for counteracting the hazard shall be specifically identified to safety
and program management. Continuation of effort to eliminate or reduce such hazards
shall be accomplished throughout the program by maintaining awareness of new safety
technology or devices being developed and their application to the residual hazards. Justifica-
tion for the retention of residual hazards shall be documented.
5.7 SAFETY GUIDELINES
A number of guidelines have resulted from the study and are delineated in Volume IV
(72SD4201-4). Reference shall be made to this document and supporting data in the imple-
mentation of nuclear safety guidelines for subsequent phases of the Manned Space Flight
program. Several of the significant guidelines are summarized in accordance with the
aforementioned hazard reduction precedence sequence.
5. 7. 1 DESIGN FEATURES
1. Provide special nuclear assembly and storage facilities capable of segregating
isotope and reactor storage and checkout activities.
2. Nuclear storage and checkout facilities must be provided with proper environ-
mental control and design features to reduce liquid metal hazard potential.
3. Provide redundant cooling capability for isotopes during storage, checkout,
transportation and at the launch pad.
4. Where feaSible, consider use of non-liquid metal radiators.
5. Provide a universal transporter in support of transportation and prelaunch
activities.
6. Provide for the use of the Space Shuttle as the prime and/or backup means of
launch and/or recovery of nuclear hardware.
7. Provide Storm Shelter facilities for refuge from Solar Flare events.
8. Provide on-board radiological monitoring of radiation dose accumulated by the
crew.
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· 9. Select subsystem components and component piece parts to minimize degradation
due to radiation over the mission duration.
10. Provide orbit adjust capability to rapidly change Space Base orbit altitude in the
event of a severe nuclear incident in orbit.
11. Provide separate waste management systems for crew and laboratory contaminated
waste.
12. Provide for detached module implementation of gamma ray and neutron sensitive
experiments.
13. Provide shielded storage (approximately 20 gm/cm2) for photographic film and
emulsions.
14. Locate laboratories using relatively large isotope tracer concentrations in zero-g
and possible isolatable and remo'tTable portions of the vehicle.
15. Provide a positive mechanical system for separation of the reactor power module
from the Space Base.
16. Provide fragmentation protection for nuclear hardware.
17. Design reactor to preclude criticality accidents (destructive excursions).
18. Provide positive means of sensing reactor control drum position.
19. Provide puncture and rupture protection for NaK coolant lines (double containment
features).
20. Provide an effective reactor reentry and impact protection system.
5.7.2 SAFETY DEVICES
1. Provide anti-criticality and penetration-free containment for nuclear hardware.
2. Provide control drum lock-out devices for reactor power modules.
3. Consider use of dummy power: modules for integration tests in VAB.
4. Provide compatible liquid metal fire protection and fighting capability wherever
liquid metals are present.
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5. Provide radiation and thermal shields for prolonged operations around a large
isotope heat source.
6. Provide multiple escape routes.
7. Consider use of liquid metal sump tanks.
8. Provide safing of the S-II destruct system as Eurasian overfly is made.
9. Provide means of safing a reactor in a quasi-steady state critical condition.
10. Provide rapid response recovery, safing and decontamination capability over
entire potential impact zone.
11. Provide emergency EVA suits compatible with a NaK environment.
12. Provide shielding and control interlocks and restrict reorientation of dynamic
radiati<:m generators (x-rays, ion guns, lasers and microwave sources).
13. Provide an effective and automatic means of reactor shutdown under all
conditions.
14. Provide for positive and permanent reactor shutdown prior to disposal and at
end of mission.
15. Provide for the safe and prompt disposal of a spent or malfunctioning reactor.
16. Provide tracking and location aids for land and water recovery of nuclear
hardware.
5.7.3 WARNING DEVICES
1. Provide personnel dosimetry and radiation monitoring and warning signs and
instrumentation in all areas where nuclear hardware is present.
2. Provide proper escort and warnings during transportation.
3. Provide rapid response fire alarm and detection systems for liquid metal fires.
4. Provide proper liquid metal fire fighting materials with yellow markings.
5. Provide integrated dose, nuclear system status and fault diagnostic support in
orbit and at the Mission Control Center (MCC).
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, 6. Provide ground supported advanced warnings of malfunctions or hazardous
conditions where possible (solar flare event, etc.)
7. Provide a central on-board warning system for monitoring and alerting against
radiological hazards.
8. Provide proper governmental authorities with technical data for advanced
warnings and preparations required for impending ground impact of nuclear material.
9. Provide means for monitoring and warning of imminent collisions with space
debris and orbiting vehicles.
10. Provide instrumentation to detect LiH shield punctures.
11. Provide for liquid metal leak detection during prelaunch and in orbit.
5.7.4 SPECIAL PROCEDURES
1. Select routes to avoid heavily travelled and populated areas in the transport of
nuclear hardware.
2. Use cross-trained personnel in support of nuclear hardware prelaunch activities
with actual real situation experience (radiation and liquid metal hazards).
3. Limit and regulate personnel/activities in radiation areas.
4. Limit use and presence of ordnance and disposal rocket motors within nuclear
facilities.
5. Perform reactor cirticality checks prior to delivery to launch site (KSC).
6. Limit criticality testing to provide negligible fission product inventory during
prelaunch.
7. Employ two man "buddy" system in hazardous areas.
8. Install reactor power modules and isotopes systems as late in the prelaunch
sequence as feasible.
9. Provide appropriate procedural modifications in the KSC Ground Safety Plans
and the USAF Range Safety Manual.
10. Keep nuclear hardware operations at the launch pad to a minimum.
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, 11. Maintain control drum lockouts in position during prelaunch operations. Restrict
control drum movement to a single drum.
12. Conduct thorough evaluation of the necessity and desirability of integration and
testing of nuclear reactor power modules within the VAB.
13. Restrict smoking and eating in radiation and liquid metal areas.
14. Maintain current administratively controlled areas with a minimum radius of
approximately 13 km and exclusions areas of 4 km radius.
15. Consider limiting flight termination impact areas to outside the continental shelf.
16. Provide continuous attended support by the MCC for warning, radiological control
and fault diagnosis.
17. Establish crew rotation procedures in conformance with career and periodic dose
guidelines.
18. Restrict EVA during orbits intercepting the South Atlantic Anomaly.
19. Restrict approach paths of vehicles employing IR (infrared) sensors to avoid inter-
ference from high temperature sources.
20. Establish minimum rendezvous distances and shielded approach corridors to
orbital vehicles employing nuclear power systems to minimize exposure of
crew.
21. Provide experiment data screening procedures for experiments sensitive to
South Atlantic Anomaly interference.
22. Minimize power level on operating reactors during reactor replacement.
23. Repairs to NaK lines or in the reactor gallery area are not considered feasible.
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SECTION 6
SAFETY TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION
6.1 GROUND TESTING
Operation and testing of nuclear hardware has certain inherent radiation thermal and liquid
metal hazards which can be substantially minimized through proper training of personnel.
Specific training should be provided for handling and operations involved with liquid metals.
The training should include certification of skills associated with environmental control,
leak detection, safing and actual fire fighting under simulated operational conditions.
Special training associated with the ground assembly, handling and testing of a reactor and
nuclear heat sources including the non-criticality ground testing of the control drum/actuator
systems must be provided, demonstrated and certification given. Proper use of radiation
monitoring instrumentation and adherence to radioactive material regulations must be
demonstrated. The training should include contingency actions for potential radiological
emergencies including the provision of specially trained and equipped nuclear material re-
covery and safing teams.
6.2 IN ORBIT HANDLING, REPLACEMENT AND REPAIR
Training in the handling, transfer and replacement of reactor power modules and isotope
heat sources in zero-g should be provided under zero-g or simulated zero-g conditionS.
Comprehensive training should be provided in fault diagnosis and repair of components in the
reactor power module engine room under suited and unsuited conditions. Rendezvous and
docking simulation for initial power module assembly or replacement must be provided.
In orbit and zero':'g decontamination procedures and techniques developed require special
training.
6.3 IN-FLIGHT START-UP AND OPERATION
Training and certification in the remote start-up, power module stabilization and operation
must be provided under simulated conditions. Operator control response, sensitivity and
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response to fallure conditions shall be demonstrated along with the ability to diagnose 'and
isolate failure conditions. Specific training in powering down, load sharing and leveling
and management of the power conversion systems must be emphasized.
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SECTION 7
SAFETY TEST REQUIREMENTS
A series of tests must be provided to ascertain the functional integrity of the nuclear hard-
ware design and key performance characteristics which affect the safety of the system.
Several of the principle tests have been noted. Additional tests should be anticipated and
specified as firm nuclear hardware designs are developed.
7.1 REACTOR CONTROL DRUM INTERLOCKS
Safety testing of the reactor control drum interlock mechanism should be performed under
simulated flight conditions, including prelaunch testing, launch abort and earth impact to
determine the adequacy of the fail-safe design features.
7.2 REACTOR PERMANENT SHUTDOWN DEVICES
Safety testing of the effectiveness and reliability of the permanent shutdown features of the
reactor should be performed.
7.3 ABLATIVE SHIELD TESTS
Simulated and actual flight tests of the reactor ablative heat shield should be performed to
assure shield integrity under all possible pre and post-operative reentry conditions
7.4 FRAGMENTATION AND IMPACT TESTS
Isotope capsules and the reactor/shield should undergo simulated fragmentation and impact
testing to assure integrity per specification, under launch explosion and earth impact con-
ditions. Propensity for compaction accidents should also be determined.
7. 5 FUEL ELEMENT ABUTION TESTS
Conduct ablative tests of reactor and heat source fuel elements/capsules to ascertain integ-
rity and provide source terms.
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7.6. REACTOR TRANSIENT TESTS
Conduct tests to determine modes and characteristics of destructive excursions, tempera-
ture excursions, over moderation and quasi-steady state operation conditions.
7.7 FffiEBALL SIMULATION
Conduct tests to determine intensity and potential effects of booster fireballs on nuclear
hardware.
7.8 DISPOSAL SYSTEM RELIABILITY
The reliability of the disposal system is a major factor in terrestrial safety. The reliability
of components after long term (10 year) exposure to space and radiation should be substan-
tiated.
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SECTION 8
HAZARDOUS TEST REQUIREMENTS
8.1 REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM TESTS
Detailed test procedures should be prepared and verified under simulated launch center con-
ditions for the reactor non-critical control drum. and actuator system checks.
8.2 NUCLEAR HARDWARE ASSEMBLY
Where it is required to assemble a heat source/fuel elements, tests will be performed to
determine shielding fixture and handling tool compatibility as well as projected integrated
exposure dosages.
8.3 NUCLEAR HARDWARE INTEGRATION AND CHECKOUT
Tests that are associated with the mating, environmental control, liquid metal leak detec-
tion, and fire protection requirements during integration and checkout with the launch vehicle
at the VAB and launch pad require precautionary procedures and special ground support
equipment. Procedures and equipment must be verified.
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SECTION 9
SAFETY ANALYSIS OF TEST AND FLIGHT ANOMALIES
9.1 LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Launching of the Space Base assemblies, including the nuclear reactor power modules, into
a 55 degree orbital inclination requires a "dog-leg" boost or overflight of Eurasion land
areas during boost. Safety analyses should be considered for determining the maximum
release of radioactive material if impact occurs in these land areas and recommending
means of reducing the potential radiological hazards.
9.2 TEST ANOMALIES
A safety and performance analysis should be conducted to determine the power level and
time limitations for low power criticality tests at the factory.
Detailed safety analysis should also be made to determine the maximum radiation exposure
that could occur to the launch site personnel from accidental radioactive material release
during the assembly and checkout test operations. Contingency plans and remedial medical
facilities should be planned on the maximum exposure basis.
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SECTION 10
SAFETY MOTIVATION
All personnel on the Space Base program that handle, test or operate devices containing
nuclear and/or radioactive material should be thoroughly and periodically briefed to the
inherent and subtle affects of radiation exposure to humans. The following nuclear safety
precautions that should be of general concern to all program personnel are:
1. Importance of adherence to radiological safety regulations and monitoring
procedures
2. Use of the ''buddy system" in hazardous areas
3. Cleanliness
4. Liquid metal hazards and handling requirements
5. Provision and adherence to all warning signs.
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SECTION 11
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
A means of reporting and investigating accidents/incidents rapidly must be set up and
effective steps taken to prevent or minimize further occurrence. Reference should be
made to U. S. Government document 10CFR20, Section 20.403, "Notification of Incidents",
for reporting procedures.
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SECTION 12
SYSTEM SAFETY DATA
Whenever practical, existing data systems should be utilized to provide safety information
for a program system safety data bank. Such a data system may be amilogous to a simple
closed loop block diagram as shown in Figure 12-1.
The input function block consists of planning data, which could include: (1) previous ex-
perience and knowledge from other programs; (2) baseline or reference configurations or
missions; (3) safety goals, objectives and initial criteria; (4) program safety requirements;
(5) contractor safety requirements; and (6) safety plans for approach techniques, organiza-
tion structure, responsibility and reporting.
The driving function block consists of safety implementation, which could include: (1) design;
(2) devices, (3) safety procedures, both preventive and remedial; (4) training and certifica-
tion; (5) testing; and (6) motivation.
INPUT DRIVING FUNCTION
SAFETY
-
SAFETY
-
PLANNING - - IMPLEMENTATION~
SAFETY
MEASUREMENT
Figure 12-1. Data System
OUTPUT
SAFETY
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The' feedback function block consists of safety measurement which could include; (1) hazard
analysis identification and categorization; (2) test data; (3) safety study results; (4) safety
survey data; and (5) accident/incident data.
An effective system safety data system can benefit a program by: (1) aiding design in pre-
venting repetitive design deficiencies; (2) providing program management with safety visi-
bility, from an updated identified hazards listing; (3) providing aid in making timely decisions
to eliminate or mitigate potential hazards; and (4) providing a measure of the adequacy of
implemented safety efforts through hazards identification analysis, surveys and accident/
incident reports.
The Program Radiation Protection Office should maintain the program radiological safety
data bank. He should provide contractors with safety goals, objectives, safety and design
criteria and requirements. He should receive from contractors, safety plans, identified
hazards and category listings, safety study reports, accident/incident data and hazard
elimination or mitigation data.
The Program Radiation Protection Officer should provide the Center Radiation Protection
Officer with safety criteria, goals, objectives, identified inherent potential hazards,
facilities and support safety requirements. He should receive from the Center Radiation
Protection Officer, preventive and remedial procedures, a Center Radiological Safety
Plan, Safety Training Certification, accident/incident data, hazard analysis of test and
flight anomalies, and rescue/recovery plans.
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CONVERSION FACTORS
INTERNATIONAL TO ENGLISH UNITS
Physical Quantity
Acceleration
Area
Density
Energy
Force
Length
Mass
Power
Pressure
Speed
Temperature
Volume
International
Units
2
m/sec
2
m
2Kg/m
Joule
Newton
m
Kg
watt
Newton/m2
m/sec
K
English Units
2ft/sec
ft2
. 2
10
Ib/ft3
Ib/in3
Btu
lbf
ft
nm
Ibm
Btu/sec
Btu/min
Btu/hr
Atmosphere
Ibf/in2
Ibf/ft2
ft/ sec (fps)
F
Conversion Factor
Multiply By
3.281
10.764
1550.39
6.242 x 10-2
3.610 x 10-5
2.248 x 10-1
3.281
-45.399 x 10
2.205
9.488 x 10-4
5.691 x 10-2
3.413
3.413
1.451 x 10-4
2.088 x 10-2
3.281
(9/5 - 459.67/tK)
6.097 x 104
35.335
I
Abort
Accident
Airborne Material
Breached
Bulk Damage (Radiation)
Contamination·
Control Drum Motion
Core Compaction
Cover Gas
Credible
Criticality
Critical Mass
Cumulative Probablllty
Damaged
Decontamination
Destructive Excursion
Disassembly/Disassembled
Disposal
Distributed Material
Dose Guidelines
Dosimetry
II
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Premature and abrupt termination of an event or mission because of existing or imminent
degradation or fallure of hardware. (In the safety analysis, no distinction is made between
an accident and abort.)
An undesirable unplanned event which mayor may not result from a system failure or mal-
function.
Radioactive gases, vapors and particulates released to the air.
Fuel elements, coolant loops, pressure vessel, core, or radiation shield are (a) physically
torn by thermal or mechanical stresses, (b) cut open by fragmentation or (c) split open by
internal pressures.
Radiation causing atomic displacement in semiconductor devices - sometimes commonly
referred to as "crystal" damage.
A condition where a radioactive material is mixed or adheres to a desirable substance or
where radioactivity has spread to places where it may harm persons, experiments or make
areas unsafe.
Rotation of the control drums or drum toward or away from the most reactive position within
a reactor. (As used in safety analysis results in a reactor excursion.)
The act of increasing the density of the core which results in increased reactivity and possible
criticality.
A gas blanket used to prOvide an inert atmospheric environment around hardware to minimize
potential reactions which can give rise to accident situations.
An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurence of > 10-12 .
The act of obtaining and sustaining a chain reaction.
The mass of fissionable material necessary to obtain criticality.
Sometimes referred to as "Mission probability" is the overall probability of a sequence of
events occurring (product of "relative probabilities" of the Individual events along a path of
an abort sequence tree).
Same as "Breached".
The removal of undesired dispersed radioactive substances from material, personnel, rooms,
equipment, air, etc. (e. g., washing, filtering, chipping).
An excursion (safety analysis assumes _ 100 MW-sec) accompanied by a complete disassembly
of the reactor, a prompt radiation emission and release of fission product gases, vapors and
particulates.
Nuclear hardware (e. g., reactor) which has been violently broken or separated into parts and
not capable of forming a critical mass.
The planned discarding or recovery of nuclear hardware.
The spread of nuclear fuel and radioactive debris on the earth's surface following impact or
destructive excursion.
Established radiation levels used in the nuclear safety analysis for evaluating number of
exposures and in determining operating limits and boundaries.
Techniques used in the measurement of radiation.
Dynamic Interference
Early Reactor Disposal
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CO NT)
An experiment radiation effect where the flux rate above some threshold (a fraction of the ex-
periment slgnal-to-nolse ratio at maximum sensitivity, for electronic detectors) causes
noticeable degradation of data quality.
Attempted disposal of the reactor prior to Its successful completion of 5 years operational
lifetime.
Electrical Power System
End of Mission
Excursion
Exposure Limit
Fission Products
Fuel
Fuel Element/Capsule
Fuel Element Ablation
Fuel Element Burlal
Gallery
Ground Deposited Particles
Hazard
Hazard Source
Immediate Reentry
Impact In Deep Ocean
Impact in Reservoir
Impact In Water Containing
Edible Marine Life
Intact Reentry/Reactor
Integrated/Cumulative Dose
Interfacing Vehicle
All components (heat source, regulation, control, power conversion and radiators) necessary
for the development of electrical power. The reactor electrical power system includes all
hardware associated with the Power Module with the exception of the Disposal System.
Generally associated with the termination of \he mission or flight. Is also used to define those
activities involved with disposal and recovery of hardware after Intended lifetime.
A rapid and usually unplanned increase In thermal power associated with the operation of a
power reactor.
Total accumulated or time dependent radiation exposure limits imposed on personnel by regula
tory agencies or limits which preclude equ.ipment damage.
The nuclides (quite often radioactive) produced by the fission of a heavy element nucllde such
as V-235 or Pu-239.
Fissionable material in a reactor or radioisotopes in a heat source used in producing energy.
A shaped body of nucleat" fuel prepared for use in a reactor or heat source. Common usage
involves some form of encapsulation.
Fuel element clad and/or fuel removed by reentry heating, releasing fission products to the
atmosphere.
Individual fuel elements beneath the ground surface completely covered by soil.
The compartment of the reactor shield which houses the major primary loop components.
Particles deposited on the ground from radioactive fallout.
An existing situation caused by an unsafe act or condition which can result In harm or
damage to personnel and equipment.
The location and/or origin of the hazard.
Very early reentry of the reactor (e. g., misaligned thrust vector which causes firing of the
reactor disposal rockets toward earth resulting In 1-2 day reentry).
Reentering and/or Impact of nuclear material in the ocean, beyond the Continental Shelf where
contamination of the food chain is extremely remote.
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in reservoir containing potable drinking water.
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear materIal on the Continental Shelf or In a body of
water such as a lake, river or stream where contamination of the food chain is likely.
A nuclear system that retains its integrity upon impact and in the case of a reactor is capable
of undergoing an excursion.
The total dose resulting from all or repeated exposures to radiation.
Any defined module, spacecraft, booster or logistic vehicle which may have an Interaction
with the Manned Space Base.
III
Ionization Damage
Land Impact
Loss of Coolant
Mission Support
Moderator
NaK-78
No Discernible Hazard
Non-credible
Non-destructive Excursion
Normal Operations
Over Moderation
Permanent Shutdown
Polson
Power Module
Premature Reentry
Pre-polson
Prompt Radiation
Quasi-Steady State
Radiological COIl8equences
Radiological Hazards
Radiological Risk
Random Reentry
Reactivity
N
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Radiation causing surface damage In materials (e. g., the fogging of film).
Nuclear hardware which Impacts land at terminal velocities following reentry and lower velo-
cities during prelaunch or early In the launch/ascent phase.
Loss of organic or liquid metal coolant in reactor coolant loops due to failure/accident.
Supporting functions provided the Space Base Program by ground personnel and interfacing
vehicles throughout all mission phases.
Material used In a nuclear reactor to slow down neutrons from the high energies at which they
are released to increase the probability of neutron c·apture: Water and hydrogen are modera-
tors In a thermal reactor.
An alloy of sodium (22% by weight) and potassium (78%) used as a liquid metal heat transfer
fluid.
Represents no hazard to the general populace.
An event having a relative or cumulative probablllty of occurrence of < 10-12 • Considered
not worthy of concern.
A temperature excursion which may rupture the primary coolant loop and release fission pro-
ducts to the environment but - leaves the reactor shield essentially intact.
Planned and anticipated mission activities and events.
Immersion of reactor In an hydrogenous medium (moderator) resulting in increased neutron
reflection into the core causing a reactor excursion.
Enacting provisions which preclude reactor criticality under all foreseeable circumstances.
A material that absorbs neutrons and reduces the reactivity of a rea"tor.
The complete reactor/shield, radiator, power conversion system and disposal system unit as
provided on the Space Base.
Any reentry of the reactor from Earth orbit with orbital lifetimes less than the planned (1167
year) orbital decay time of the 990 km disposal altitude.
A polson which is added to the reactor fuel for purposes of controlling reacticity. Sometimes
referred to as "burnable poison".
The neutron and gamma radiation released coincident with tIE fission process as opposed to the
radiation from fission product decay. Commonly associated with an excursion event.
A term used to describe the condition when a reactor periodically goes critical and then sub-
critical due to water surging in and out of the core.
The radiation exposure effect On personnel and the ecology from a radiation release accident or
event.
Hazards associated with radiation as differentiated from other sources.
The term used to define the average number of people anticipated to be affected by radiation
in a given mission or phase thereof.
The uncontrolled non-directed reentry of a vehicle from orbit.
A measure of the departure of a reactor from critical such that positive values correspond to
reactors super""rltical and negative values to reactors which are sub""ritical. (Usuallyex-
pressed In multiples of a dollar.)
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Reactor Falls to Survive Reentry
Reactor SUrvives Reentry
Reactor/Shield
Relative Probability
Repair/Replacement
Ruptured
safety
safety Catastrophic
Safety Critical
Safety Marginal
Safety Negligible
Scram System
System Safety
Space Base Program
Space Debris
Space Shuttle
Source Terms
Tracer
Reactor/shield is completely disassembled by reentry heating, releasing individual fuel ele-
ments and structural debris to the atmosphere.
Reactor is not disassembled by reentry heating; radiation shield may be damaged.
A system containing the reactor, control drums, gallery and surrounding LiH and Tungsten
shield.
Probability of the occurrence of a particular event given a defined set of choices.
Consists of (a) physically repalring all faulty systems, or (b) complete replacement of the
faulty system(s).
Same as ''Breached''.
Freedom from chance of injury or loss to personnel, equipment or property.
Condition(s) such tlBt environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will severely degrade system perform-
ance, and cause subsequent system loss, death, or multiple injuries to personnel (SPD-IA).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will cause equipment damage or per-
sonnel injury, or will result in a hazard requiring immediate corrective action for personnel
or system survival (SPD-IA).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem failure or component malfunction will degrade system perform-
ance but which can be counteracted or controlled without major damage or any injury to
personnel (SPD-IA).
Condition(s) such that personnel error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or
subsystem failure or component malfunction wlll not result in minor system degradation and
will not produce system functional damage or personnel injury (SPD-IA).
A separate. possibly automatic. mechanism used to rapidly shut down a reactor.
The optimum degree of risk management within the constraints of operational effectiveness,
time and cost attained through the application of management and engineering principles
throughout all phases of a program.
All aspects of the Space Base mission including all prime and support hardware and pe'rsonnel
both on the ground, at sea or in orbit. which are required throughout all mission phases.
Uncontrolled radioactive or non-radioactive man-made objects in space; these objects may
present collision and radiation hazards to earth orbital missions.
The manned vehicle used for the transportation of cargo to and from earth orbit. A sepa-
rately launched vehicle (booster) on which the Shuttle is placed provides the initial first
stage thrust.
Characterization of a radiation hazard with regard to (a) location, (b) magnitude, and
(c) exposure mode.
Materialln which isotopes of an element may be incorporated to make possible observation
of the course of the element through a chemical. biological or physical process.
V/VI
